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In the 1970s, first-world fantasies of “ecologically noble savages” were
key to the creation of alliances between indigenous groups, environmen-
talists, and affluent first-world publics (Conklin and Graham 1995). More
recently, however, anthropologists have grown increasingly critical of
such stereotypes of indigenous people (Buege 1996). In areas as diverse as
Amazonia, Australia, North America, and Indonesia, indigenous peoples
find their political leverage derives from filling first-world fantasies that
are often essentialized and stifling (Brown 2003; Carneiro da Cunha and
Almeida 2000; Li 2000; Povinelli 1999).
This dynamic has taken another interesting twist in Papua New Guinea.
Unlike many Commonwealth countries, Papua New Guinea has no settler
population, and, unlike many African states, it has no majority ethnic
group. Furthermore, Australia’s administration of Papua New Guinea was
both well meaning and under-resourced. As a result there has been little
alienation of land and it is difficult to recognize Papua New Guineans as
“indigenous people” separate from “settler” populations, as is typically
done in Australia, Africa, and the New World. At the same time, however,
Papua New Guinea is highly reliant on resource rents, and the activities of
international logging, mining, and hydrocarbon companies present a pic-
ture of a David-and-Goliath struggle between local people and transna-
tional capital that is comfortably familiar to many first-world activists.
Like scholars elsewhere, Melanesianists are increasingly dissatisfied
with stereotypes of grassroots Papua New Guineans as ecologically noble
savages. A growing literature has, for instance, emphasized the ways in
which compensation claims for damage to the environment are part of a
complex local politics. Glenn Banks has argued that compensation claims
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are often a way of expressing a sense of disenfranchisement by people
outside of mining lease areas (2002), while Martha Macintyre and Simon
Foale have argued convincingly that even for people within mining lease
areas, claims of environmental damage are often expressions of dissatis-
faction with social concerns couched in environmental idioms (2002).
But there is a danger that these responsible works could be misread by
policy elites in Port Moresby, the national capital, who often see land-
owners as savages more nasty than noble. Papua New Guineans have one
of the best track records in the world for extracting concessions from for-
eign developers and the national government, and the demands of land-
owners have become so strident that the overall perception nationwide is
that they are corrupted opportunists who have given up their traditional
culture in order to “go for money” (Filer and others 2000). Thus, at one
industry conference in 2000, the president of the Papua New Guinea
Chamber of Mining and Petroleum claimed that “people issues are at the
forefront of the mining and petroleum industries” in Papua New Guinea.
The industry’s biggest challenge, he claimed, were “community problems
that could have been avoided” and that were caused by “so-called ‘land-
owners’” who ripped off the government. “The rip-off is so blatant,” he
said, “[that] it penetrates into the fabric of the government” (Golub field-
notes 2000). Other speakers were more blunt. “Community affairs issues
will shut down this country,” said one mining executive, himself from the
highlands region (Golub fieldnotes 2000).
Issues of compensation, development, and positive and negative values
associated with “savagery” thus take on a unique figuration in contem-
porary Papua New Guinea. In this article I examine some of these issues
by describing the Ipili response to mining at the Porgera gold mine in the
highlands province of Enga. The proactive Ipili response to mining is not,
I argue, a result of their “corruption” from a “pure” state prior to Euro-
pean contact, but an elaboration of deep-seated themes in their culture
that are perfectly intelligible given their unique historical circumstances.
Making sense of Ipili “corruption” thus provides one way to rethink the
various stereotypes of savages—both nasty and noble—that are in play
today. In closing I suggest that if anthropologists have, as outside
“experts,” the ability to grasp something about Ipili culture that might
elude the Ipili themselves, it is also possible that the Ipili have come to
understand the cultures of the first-worlders they encounter better than
we are willing to admit. For just as Western anxieties about the environ-
ment shape how “we” imagine them as savages both noble and ignoble,
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so too do Ipili aspirations for “development” lead them to ponder the
value and morality of the white world, which so eagerly seeks the gold in
their valley.
The Mine and the Ipili
The Ipili are an ethnic group of roughly 6,000 people living in the Por-
gera district in the far west of Enga Province in the highlands of Papua
New Guinea (book-length monographs about them include Banks 1997;
Biersack 1980; Filer 1999; Golub 2001; Jacka 2003; and Jackson and
Banks 2001). Ipili live in two valleys—the Porgera and Paiela. Since con-
tact with the Australian administration in the late 1930s, Porgera’s massive
ore body has made it central to Ipili history as well as Papua New Guinea.
Mining and hydrocarbon developments are of primary importance in con-
temporary Papua New Guinea, which has relied on taxes and royalties
from extractive industries to prop up its sagging budget. In 2004, for
instance, 5.9 billion kina worth of minerals (including oil) was exported,
constituting 73 percent of all exports (Bank of PNG 2004; for an over-
view of the industry, see Banks 2001). (Throughout this period the kina
was worth roughly one US dollar.)
Operated by its majority shareholder, the Vancouver-based, transna-
tional Placer Dome Inc, Porgera rose to global prominence in 1992—its
second year of production—when it produced 1,485,077 ounces of gold,
making it the third most productive gold mine in the world. Porgera mine
continues to be a national priority today even as it matures ( Jackson and
Banks 2002). In 2004 the mine produced roughly 740,000 ounces of gold
and accounted for roughly 15 to 20 percent of the country’s gross domes-
tic product, and forecasts for 2005 expect output to approach 790,000
ounces (Placer Dome Inc 2004).
For many reasons—mostly having to do with the government’s good
intentions and weak army—the Ipili have been some of the most active
and successful indigenous people in the world to have pressed claims
against the state and global capital. Between 1987 and 1996, compensa-
tion payments from the company alone amounted to 30,927,886 kina
(Filer and others 2000, 95). In addition, the Ipili own equity in the mine,
have received another 12,423,930 kina in wages between 1989–1992,
receive royalties from gold sales, and have a multitude of new services
provided to them by the government, including a hospital, new roads, a
trust fund that will pay school fees for the children, and a variety of other
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services (Filer 1999, 108). Indeed, the Ipili are not only the lessors of the
special mining lease on which Placer operates the Porgera gold mine, they
own the high-rise building in Port Moresby where Placer Niugini has its
corporate headquarters. So thorough-going are Ipili attempts to extract
benefits from the mine that Timothy Andambo has described the tangle
of trust funds, equity companies, and committees that manage the Ipili’s
numerous investments as “social technology to extract rent from the
Porgera lode” (2002). While later compensation agreements signed in
Papua New Guinea proved more lucrative than the Porgera agreements
negotiated by the Ipili in the late 1980s, the Ipili’s were the model on
which subsequent deals were based, and they remain today a signal
example of indigenous people negotiating successfully with both govern-
ment and industry.
While many landowners are vilified at the national level, few seem to
have been as strongly disliked for as long as the Ipili. The word generally
used is “truculent.” Government patrol officer John Black remarked in an
interview that he “found the people on the Porgera to be very truculent
and cheeky” when he first ventured into the area in 1938 (Davis 1994). In
a 1964 report, one administration official noted that “the Porgera have a
long history of truculence” (Porgera, folder 2, 64/65). Mervyn Meggitt
recorded his impression of them as “a truculent and difficult people”
(1974, 42). Even Father Philip Gibbs, a Catholic priest with many years
experience in Porgera, wrote that “the Ipili are not the most co-operative
people to work with. At times I was prepared to agree with Meggitt”
(1975, 23). Contemporary opinion is much the same. During my first visit
to the PNG Department of Mines in Port Moresby, the Porgera mining
coordinator introduced me by saying, “Everyone, this is Alex Golub, he’s
an anthropologist studying the Porgera landowners—he actually lives
with them!” (Golub fieldnotes 2000). The overall view was summarized
with epigrammatic flair by one of the senior officials of the mine who said
to me simply, “They’re a fucked culture” (Golub fieldnotes 2000).
In addition to “truculence,” white outsiders are also often disappointed
by how Ipili spend mine-derived income. Much recent thinking among
Papua New Guinean elites has been shaped by the rhetoric of the “triple
bottom line” of social, ecological, and financial responsibility, which has
become increasingly common in global corporate culture over the past
seven years. Policy elites envisioning such a triple bottom line hope that
compensation payments will be used as “seed capital” to fund businesses
that will lead to “sustainable development,” and they are inevitably dis-
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appointed by Porgerans’ less than farsighted approach to the sudden
influx of benefits they have received (Elkington 1998). Porgera has become
a boomtown with all of the associated disorders. Social impact reports
indicate that sexually transmitted diseases and domestic violence have
risen since the opening of the mine (Bonnell 1999). Money has been spent
on store-bought foods such as tinned fish and rice. Big-budget items such
as pickup trucks (utes) are purchased and quickly run into the ground,
although the stories of entire vehicles abandoned for brand-new ones
simply because of a flat tire are, of course, exaggerations. Finally, it is true
that Ipili landowners do engage in the famous drunken sprees in Port
Moresby hotels that are part of the landowner stereotype. 
In sum, although those unfamiliar with Papua New Guinea may be
tempted to see Ipili as ecologically noble savages victimized by a govern-
ment so hungry for royalties that it acts against the interests of its people,
the situation is in fact more complex. Indeed, elite views of Ipili are more
in line with stereotypes of savages who are pathologically degraded rather
than ecologically noble. Ipili landowners have come to symbolize, then,
the inverse of civilization and “development” that the metropole hopes
will result from resource development. To be sure, pumping millions of
dollars into a small rural community is enough to bring out the bad side
of just about anybody, and every gold strike has its boomtown, with all of
the excesses that entails. However, it is clear that there must be more to
Ipili culture than simply savagery. How, then, can we make sense of this
stigmatized group?
An Original Original Affluent Society?
Anthropology has long compared “our” way of life with that of “others,”
although the moral valence given to each of these terms has been notori-
ously changeable. Writings about “ecologically noble savages” are part of
a long literature that positively values the nobility of those untouched by
the corrupting influence of “our” society, a literature that can be traced
to Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1969), although he himself did not use the
phrase. Anthropologists as different as Marshall Sahlins, Margaret Mead,
and Marilyn Strathern have all used the comparative scope of anthropol-
ogy to demonstrate the arbitrary and conventional nature of the West’s
“native cosmology” to put forward alternate visions of economic activity,
sexuality, and individualism suggested by the viewpoints of other cultures
(see, eg, Sahlins 2000a). When the moral valence of the other is inverted,
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we find the now-familiar tropes of savagery and barbarism, which painted
colonial subjects as the inverse of Western utopic fantasies (Trouillot
1991). 
However, as Ira Bashkow has noted (2006), anthropologists and Euro-
peans are not the only people to use the experience of cultural difference
as an opportunity to moot their own morality. Whites, their ways of life,
and their material culture have become a touchstone by which Ipili gauge
their past and imagine their future (Bashkow 2006). To understand the
“savage” nature of the Ipili response to mining, we must understand the
way in which Ipili, like “us,” cut back and forth between positive and neg-
ative valuations of “the other.” Just as Western considerations of “sav-
ages” tell us as much about the West’s imagination of itself, so too do Ipili
imaginings of white ways of life provide a keen insight into their own
hopes and fears.
The title of this paper is filched from two separate articles by Marshall
Sahlins: “The Original Affluent Society” (2000b) and “The Segmentary
Lineage: An Organization of Predatory Expansion” (1961). “The Origi-
nal Affluent Society” famously argues that hunter-gatherer societies are
not starving, desperate primitives but simply people who work much less
than “us westerners” and do not mind the lower standards of living that
result. The article then spins this out into a critique of Western concep-
tions of human nature, which take as their premise the idea that people
are inherently “infinitely needy.” “The Segmentary Lineage” proposes that
the African lineage systems described in British Structural-Functionalism
do not tend toward equilibrium but are part of an aggressive, historically
specific moment of territorial expansion of the Tiv and Nuer. Since
Sahlins’s use of the term “affluent society” took liberties with John Ken-
neth Galbraith’s earlier book of that title (1958), I figured Sahlins would
not mind if I followed suit. My juxtaposition is meant to be more than
merely cute—I mean to use “original affluent society: an organization of
predatory expansion” to characterize (with only a little bit of violence to
the original meaning of the terms) Ipili response to miners.
The Ipili are an “affluent society” in Galbraith’s original sense of a peo-
ple whose historical consciousness is haunted by a past they imagine as an
“unedifying mortification of the flesh—from hunger, sickness, and cold”
and who revel in dreams of a future world provided by mining revenues
“where the ordinary person has access to amenities—foods, entertain-
ment, personal transportation, and plumbing—in which not even the rich
rejoiced a century ago” (Galbraith 1958, 2). Thus while Sahlins inverts
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Galbraith’s image of 1950s satiety to suggest that hunter-gatherers had
their needs satisfied because they were not plagued by infinite want, I flip
Sahlins’s image back over to suggest that Ipili see themselves in very much
the same light that Galbraith suggests.
By “predatory expansion” I mean not territorial expansion but a unique
approach to the lifeways and material culture of Australians and, by
extension, white people more generally. Ipili have aggressively sought to
co-opt and control outsiders in order to gain benefits that will mitigate
unpleasant aboriginal circumstances. The unique focus with which Ipili
have prosecuted the finding and taking of novel ideas and concepts rep-
resents a culturally specific way of incorporating novelty into their lives.
Like the Hageners described by Francesca Merlan and Alan Rumsey, Ipili
have a “rapacious desire to experience and explore . . . novelty” (1991,
231). This expansive, desirous attempt to capture foreign novelty is in
part a result of Ipili situation in the “Papua Borderlands” where there has
always been a flow of goods, ideas, and people between centers of popu-
lation (Biersack 1995). But even more than this, Porgeran “expansiveness”
is a natural outgrowth of deep-seated themes in Ipili culture, and it is to
these themes that I now turn. 
Themes in Ipili Culture
In order to understand the cultural origin of Ipili responses to mining, it
is necessary to begin at a very abstract level—with their cosmology. As
Aletta Biersack has pointed out, at the base of Ipili cosmology is a deep-
seated concern with entropy and labor, “an Ipili metaphysics of finitude”
rooted in the idea that “life is perpetuated only at the cost of life, that
regeneration and death are, inexplicable dimensions of the human condi-
tion” (1998, 43). Ipili understand their own life energy to be finite, and
in expending it through work they deplete themselves in what Biersack
calls a “service economy” (1995b, 241). Thus work creates replacement
even as it diminishes the worker. In the case of children, both the trans-
mission of bodily fluids in conception and the labor of child rearing
strengthen the growing child, even as they literally exhaust the parent. 
Ipili express this by saying that their children are their lawa. At its base
level, lawa means to exchange, in the sense of switching places or roles.
Ipili gloss the term in Tok Pisin as sens (change). For instance, a man once
told me of his young son, “Em i sens bilong mi”—literally, “He is my
change.” Thus, a man is replaced by the son he nurtured, as the son
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becomes the leader of the household, the hardest worker, and so forth.
Similarly, the practice of sister exchange is referred to as imalini lawa lawa
(cross-sex sibling exchange), because the sister of a new affine (relative by
marriage) takes the place of your sister when you marry her, just as your
sister has married her cross-sex sibling. Thus the Ipili verb lawa combines
notions of reproduction and transformation, replacement and innovation
in a way that does not pit one process against the other: a woman comes
to take the place of one’s sister, but the sister’s replacement is an affine
and not a consanguine (blood relative).
This zero-sum system of energy transmission and replacement is what
Biersack has called “the sacrificial principle”: “equivalence is always
achieved through reciprocal labor and life, through a mutuality of sacri-
fice” (Biersack 1998, 55). I have referred to it as a “work-wealth equation”
(see Golub 2001, 78–80). Unlike the classical protestant attitude in which
work is considered ennobling, Ipili see work as a necessary but tiresome
activity from which you can gain no surplus—you get out what you put
in. You work, you get old, and you die. Here is Galbraith’s life of hard-
ship that I mentioned earlier: for the Ipili, there really is nothing but death
and taxes.
Further, Biersack has argued that the Ipili distinguish between nembo,
which she glosses as “mind,” and umbaini, which she glosses as “body”
or “skin.” They employ a theory of action in which promises to act
(words) are proved true indicators of a hidden intentionality only when
they are redeemed by the performance of the promised action—a move-
ment of the body (flesh). It is for this reason that Biersack (1996), bor-
rowing from the Gospel of John, says that for Ipili, action is “word made
flesh” (John 1:14). However, it is important to note that nembo has an
affective component tied to Ipili notions of desire. Translating nembo as
“mind” and linking it with John’s “word” (in Greek, logos), Biersack pro-
duces overtones of logic and rationality that I believe fail to capture the
full force of the Ipili term. Nembo does move people to action, and Ipili
people do say it is made manifest “on the skin.” But I believe a better
translation would be something along the lines of “appetitive desire” or
“desirous intelligence.” Nembo is the intentional part of people, but it is
always directed toward an object, and for affective or desirous ends. It is
the hunger or desire that prompts to action. Indeed, the fact that it is
manifested in the body and in action suggests that it is incarnated and
passion-filled in a way that Biersack’s Johannine phenomenology fails to
convey. 
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A brief comparison with the notion of hame among the Huli, who live
adjacent to the Ipili, will help make this point (Frankel 1986, 83–84;
140–143). While Steven Frankel linked the Huli faculty of mini as a sense
of “social responsiveness” similar to the well-documented example of
noman from Hagen (A Strathern 1981), Frankel translated hame as
“desire” or—more tellingly—“covetousness.” “This may be a simple
desire for food,” he wrote, “but extends to stronger feelings including
cupidity, lust and yearning” (Frankel 1986, 140). The pathology lingi
results when a person’s hame becomes desirous for the food that another
eats and enters their stomach, making them ill. The point to note here is
that hame is an inherent human faculty and not an unusual or patholog-
ical form of sorcery. It is for this reason that cases of lingi are accepted
with “unusual equanimity”—because “hame is regarded as an inevitable
response to the sight of food, so that the individual is not seen as culpa-
ble for any ill effects that follow from it. One woman said ‘how could we
take anyone to court when we all have eyes?’” (Frankel 1986, 140).
This concept of covetous desire, I argue, is very similar to the concept
of nembo or emborene—a term used to denote the animate, substantive
form of nembo. Ipili believe that at night, when people sleep, it is possible
for their emborene to travel outside their bodies. As in Frankel’s descrip-
tion of hame, the intent of one’s emborene is typically malicious—it seeks
to injure and hurt those of whom one is jealous and envious.
The ubiquity of this concept of emborene as roving, appetitive, vindic-
tive power is evinced in the fact that it features in the most popular story
where I conducted research: the story of the python Kupiane. In the cli-
mactic scene a couple are prevented from returning home by a sudden
rainstorm that floods a river in their path. Sleeping outdoors in the rain,
they remember their two young children who are sleeping safely and
soundly back at home. The emborene of the parents leave their bodies,
intent to attack and perhaps kill their own children out of jealousy and
envy. It is only the intervention of the python Kupiane that saves the chil-
dren. A story that features parents attacking and hurting their children is
disconcerting to outsiders, but the Kupiane myth is one of the most pop-
ular and well known in Porgera, and the sound of the cicadas’ increased
chirping (a sure sign of evil spirits in Porgera) as the parents’ emborene
approach the house is vividly performed and enthusiastically received. It
illustrates perfectly the idea that humans are driven by a faculty that is at
once rationating and spurred on by desire with an affective content:
driven, occasionally greedy, and sometimes violent. 
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Given a zero-sum metaphysics of finitude and a rational faculty that
tends toward the appetitive, it is not surprising to find that Ipili culture
is, in some sense, about unfulfilled desire. Thus it is not surprising to see
that most Ipili religious and ritual activity is focused on ways to short-cir-
cuit the work-wealth equation. It is through religious activity that Ipili
seek to get something for nothing—to gain an increment of wealth and
fertility that comes without effort, rather than through labor. Religion
offers, for the Ipili, “an escape from an order to which the sacrificial prin-
ciple and the metaphysics of finitude from which it stems are integral”
(Biersack 1998, 60), and benefits become, for the first time, cost-free.
Response to History
If Ipili conceive of a past as full of want, they strive for a future full of
plenty. Throughout their short recorded history, the Ipili have experienced
a constant cycle of enthusiasm and disappointment focused on millennial
movements, which has shaped their response to mining. These movements
express in world-historical terms the same desire that underlies Ipili fertil-
ity rites: a short-circuiting of the work-wealth equation in a moment of
“world transfiguration,” which would replace a metaphysics of finitude
for a golden age of effortless health and prosperity. The inevitable disap-
pointment they experience does not disillusion them, however—a world
of gain with expense. The denouement of these movements always ends
up reinforcing an overall millenarian spirit even as it discredits a particu-
lar millennial movement.
At the broadest level, Ipili affinity with themes of world transformation
is prehistoric. The Ipili share with their neighbors a sense of the decreas-
ing fertility of the earth and in the past believed that only a large-scale,
region-wide series of rituals performed at certain sacred sites could renew
the earth’s fertility, which would result in a time of darkness, known in
Ipili as yu undupi (yu meaning earth, ground, territory, and undupi mean-
ing night or darkness). If the ritual was performed properly, the cosmic
clock would be reset and people would experience a period of unprece-
dented fertility with bumper crops and strong children. If the ritual was
not performed, then the world would end (for Huli equivalents, see Glasse
1995). In addition to demonstrating the antiquity of themes of Ipili trans-
figuration, beliefs in yu undupi also serve to demonstrate the unusual ten-
dency for Ipili to encounter world-transfiguring events. Like the move-
ments that would come after it, it is based firmly on actual fact. There is
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a good reason why the Ipili have a time of darkness legend—there was a
time of darkness. In the mid-seventeenth century, a volcanic island off of
the coast of Papua New Guinea erupted. The resulting cloud covered
much of the highlands, blotting out the sun for a period of days and leav-
ing a coating of extremely fertile tephra soil (Blong 1982). As a result,
crops planted after the eruption were spectacularly successful.
The period from first contact in 1938 to the establishment of an expa-
triate mining presence in Porgera in 1948 was also a time of world-trans-
forming cults. Ipili, Huli, and Enga peoples formed an active cosmopoli-
tan community through which innovations flowed, including religious
and ritual practice (Biersack 1995a). One of the most important of these
cults has come to be known in the literature as “The Cult of Ain,” which
flourished in Porgera between 1943 and 1945 (Biersack 1996; Gibbs 1977;
Jacka 2002; Meggitt 1973, 1974; Wiessner and Tumu 2001). The cult
was a response to the influx of porcine and human epidemics that swept
through Enga province as the vanguard of white penetration, and this
response exhibited a deep-seated cultural logic.
The focus of the cult was the restoration of health and the gaining of
wealth through ritual means. Participants were encouraged to sacrifice
pigs to the sky. Old taboos and sexual prohibitions were abrogated after
ritual bathing rendered people immune to pollution, and people who
undertook cult rituals often underwent ecstatic fits of shaking. In general
the cult was concerned with issues of fertility and wealth typical of a wide
variety of Melanesian societies. In Porgera, however, it took on a mil-
lenarian tone. Instead of simply bringing fertility, Porgerans believed that
the cult would bring the end of the world and the ascension of Ipili to
heaven, assuring them immortality and endless affluence. Ipili enthusias-
tically embraced the cult with spectacular consequences, including the
decimation of Ipili pig herds in massive sacrifices and one large-scale mass
suicide. By the late 1940s, however, the world failed to end, Ipili became
disenchanted, and the cult temporarily died out.
At roughly the same time a new series of prophecies was being made
by Porgerans themselves. Three men named Esape, Pingipe, and Kipu
began describing a series of visions that they received from Kupiane, the
python protagonist of the story in the previous section. At his behest, they
instituted the sacrifice of pigs at sacred pools and performed a variety of
miraculous feats using his power. Most importantly, Pingipe prophesied
that “birds from all over the world would eat fruit from the trees that
grow on Mt. Warokari” and that when that happened “the world would
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end.” Another prophecy of his predicted that “men would come with
wonderful things in their netbags” (Golub fieldnotes, 2001). 
The Cult of Ain and Pingipe’s prophecies would continue to impact Ipili
even after European contact. The presence of missionaries, miners, and the
colonial government would all come to be understood within the frame-
work of these earlier movements.
The arrival of missionaries caused the Ipili to reevaluate the Cult of Ain.
The influx of material objects, the suppression of fighting in the valley, and
the arrival of Western forms of health care (particularly medical injections)
left a huge impression. Ipili quickly came to believe that the Cult of Ain
was completely true and that Ain, like John the Baptist, had prepared
them for the coming of Jesus. The similarities between the earlier cult and
Christianity were obvious. As Philip Gibbs wrote, “Both call for the rejec-
tion of the old which is ‘bad’ and the acceptance of a ‘new way,’ a ‘good
road.’ Both have a ritual purification ceremony of washing. Both have
extraordinary happenings: shaking, or now speaking in tongues. Both
present a new figure as the center of worship: the sun and God. . . . There
is a sharing of food which distinguished the faithful. . . . Adherents are to
wait for the imminent end of the world. . . . Both have the same basic
function of improving general well being” (1977, 24).
Ipili today believe that Jesus died in 1946 or so, and that his sacrifice
“opened the roads” and allowed the flow of valuable objects and power-
ful outsiders into the valley. Good things, symbolized above all by labor-
saving steel implements and sickness-curing injections of antibiotics,
seemed exactly the sorts of things prophesied by the precontact cult.
Indeed, since most Ipili ritual before European contact revolved around
acquiring wealth and health through magical means, the coming of these
goods was itself proof that the precontact cult, as well as Christianity,
was efficacious. 
Christianity proved to be overwhelmingly popular in Porgera, and abo-
riginal rituals and religious practices stopped almost immediately. This
should not be interpreted as the triumph of Western culture over that of
the Ipili. On the contrary, the alacrity with which the Ipili became Chris-
tian was an indication of their own ability to latch onto new ideas and
take control of them. The assimilation of Christianity to the Cult of Ain
was not the replacement of old culture for new, but the Ipili’s typically
expansive attempt to take hold of and incorporate valuable new ideas into
their own culture. As a Catholic priest, Gibbs found his early missionary
work in Porgera to be deeply implicated in precontact cults. “Now when
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I ask whether the cult from Lyeimi [the Cult of Ain] was true I hear, ‘of
course it was true. Now we see the skin of the white man. Look at my
axe, my bush knife.’ ‘Yes, it was true. It has all come with the white man.’
‘Yes, it was true; now the white man has come and we have plenty of pigs
and pearl shells and soon Jesus will come and we will go to heaven’”
(Gibbs 1977, 25).
At the same time, the government was providing free services and liter-
ally opening the roads. Government penetration in Porgera took the form
of biannual patrols throughout the 1950s, which culminated in the con-
struction of the Porgera landing strip and patrol post in the early 1960s.
Thus while “opening the roads” had religious connotations for the Ipili, it
reflected concrete changes that were occurring in the valley. While the gov-
ernment-made track to Porgera was just barely navigable by four-wheel
drive, it was an improvement over what was there before. Not only was
air travel visually impressive, but it also shortened travel times immensely
and had associations with wealth and the sky that were hard to miss.
Finally, the colonial administration’s pacification of the valley, while
hardly complete, did suppress endemic feuding between Porgerans’ loose-
knit networks of kin and allowed people to move freely throughout the
valley. Unlike Australian taxpayers, the Ipili were introduced to these and
other government services as gifts of a benevolent administration for
which no payment was expected.
While Ipili welcomed government services they were not passive recip-
ients for the government’s benevolence. Government patrol officers fre-
quently found their work complicated by Ipili attempts to entangle them
in local politics. Murderers frequently turned themselves in to patrols in
order to escape payback killing from aggrieved relatives, for instance.
While officers were capable of pacifying the valley somewhat, Ipili con-
sistently acted as “free riders” in police efforts—willing to support gov-
ernment activities except when it proved inconvenient to them. Even cen-
sus taking was impossible if Ipili found it boring. All in all, then, Ipili
responses to the government demonstrated the same “expansiveness”
that marked their relationship with churches. Ipili welcomed the govern-
ment, but did their best to use it to their own ends—and they often suc-
ceeded.
Even before the government established a permanent presence, gold
miners had arrived in Porgera. Two Australians worked alluvial finds on
and off for most of the 1950s. These operations expanded in size and
eventually led to large-scale prospecting in the 1970s. The gold economy
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offered the possibility of wages as well as self-employment, and Porgera
was notable for being in the strange position of having a gold economy
before the establishment of government power.
In 1938, they had only stone tools. In the 1950s, metal tools revolu-
tionized life in the valley, while workers were paid in salt and shells—pre-
viously scarce commodities—in copious quantities. In the 1960s, Ipili
began to earn cash, and by the 1970s they owned cars and houses made
out of metal and timber. In the 1980s they began receiving money in com-
pensation for land damaged by prospecting. By the 1990s, the Ipili were
receiving compensation worth US$1 million a month in compensation
from the Porgera gold mine. 
The construction of the mine in the 1990s marked a shift of life in the
valley even more extreme than what had come before. The Porgera gold
mine meant massive physical change to the valley as well as in influx of
money that was unimaginable. In September 1990 Placer Dome had 1,500
employees working on construction—a number of people equal to the
population of the entire valley in 1952. The company was spending a mil-
lion dollars a day, and the massive physical changes they made in the val-
ley amazed even the expatriate staff assigned to serve as liaisons between
the mine and local people. One Australian who worked for the mine’s
lands department remembered: 
Basically it was cultural shock. I mean neither [the head of the lands depart-
ment] nor I had any experience of a construction of anything of this scale. I
remember walking from here where I’m sitting to Kulapi as it is now and it
took me an hour and half to walk there. And there was some pegs in the
ground over here and I said “what the hell are they?” And they said “that’s
going to be the haul road.” I said “don’t be silly, don’t be silly—look how far
apart they are! They’re a hundred meters wide!” And he said “yeah?” I hon-
estly couldn’t believe the scale. From the ground up you know, a two-minute
drive from an hour or more walk. It just blew my mind. Suddenly these
bloody huge lumps of concrete and these gigantic trucks and fellas with no
name and great power suddenly appearing, it was pretty magic stuff. (Golub
fieldnotes, 2000)
Ipili were now receiving wealth that could have been described, if it was
not for the extravagance of the Ipili imagination, as beyond their wildest
dreams—and all of it without performing any labor themselves (although,
to be sure, their loss of land was significant indeed). Between August 1987
and December 1992, Porgerans received a total of 25.9 million kina in
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compensation for damage to land that was required for the mine. In one
case a family received 520,000 kina for the land that they lost to the
mine. Compensation was often carried up by lands officers to landown-
ers’ houses in large crates, with the excess simply deposited in new bank
accounts. 
Landowners also received new homes that were electrified, and they
began receiving their first royalty payments and occupation fees. While
this was unprecedented, it was not unexpected. As far as the Ipili were
concerned, the events taking place in the 1990s had been predicted for
nearly half a century. As Ambi, Kipu’s son, told me in 2000, “Noken
abrusim, stori bilong Pingipe kamap olgeta” (You can’t ignore them, all
of Pingipe’s prophecies have come true). As one Seventh-Day Adventist
pastor told me, “Olgeta prophecy i fulfill pinis” (All of the prophecies
have been fulfilled). Pingipe, Kipu, and Wasapa were vindicated. Birds
from all over the world had come to eat the fruit growing on the slopes
of Mt Warokari.
While compensation levels dropped once construction ended and the
mine began production, the pace of change in the valley did not. In 1991
a dormant landslip became active again and began moving down toward
the government station. After attempts to avert the bulk of the damage,
the Porgera airstrip was closed along with most of the valley’s most long-
standing buildings. In 1994 the mine’s explosives plant accidentally over-
heated and over seventy-five tons of explosives detonated. Windows ten
kilometers from the site were shattered, the explosion was heard in Mt
Hagen two hundred kilometers away, the bodies of the eleven victims
were extruded through a chain-link fence around the perimeter of the
plant, and an ominous mushroom cloud formed over the valley ( Jackson
and Banks 2001, 207).
As may be expected, the millennium was also a focus of Ipili millenar-
ianism. When I first arrived in Porgera in November 1999, there was
already a palpable but “soft” concern in the valley about the end of the
world (Bashkow 2000). Ipili avidly read the newspaper stories about the
upcoming millennial bug and possible power outages. The National, the
second largest daily newspaper in Papua New Guinea, printed a millen-
nium countdown on its masthead that featured a large box with the
number of days ticking down to zero. This national focus played directly
into Ipili beliefs regarding yu undupi, since the term for global power out-
ages and yu undupi was identical (wol blakaut). Additionally, Christian
churches were active in promoting the millennium, most particularly the
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Seventh-Day Adventist community, which sponsored a weeklong prayer
meeting to prepare. The stage was thus set for yet another irony of Ipili
history on 27 December 1999, when a pipe carrying highly pressurized
oxygen burst, melting a pipe that ran parallel to it, carrying oxidized
slurry. The result was a loud hissing noise and the formation of a giant
red cloud above the mine site. Cars and buses streamed out on the only
road leaving the valley, while other people fled on foot to Paiela, and
“soft” beliefs about the end of the world hardened rapidly.
Thus, while the Ipili have not yet become immortal, their entire history
has led them to believe that such a transformation is just around the cor-
ner. Every two decades events have occurred in Porgera that fueled the
Ipili belief in the end of the world or a sea change bringing a short circuit
of the work-reward equation. Most communities in Papua New Guinea—
or anywhere else for that matter—do not usually experience mushroom-
cloud explosions, destruction of their city center due to natural disaster,
and massive house burning even once in their lifetime. In the case of Por-
gera, these fantastic events were happening almost annually. All in all,
inhabitants of the valley were living through times that any community
would find extraordinary. No wonder, then, that they thought the world
might end.
White Utopias and Dystopias
One of the senior employees of the Porgera gold mine in charge of ensur-
ing “sustainable development” in Porgera likes to use biblical imagery to
explain his job. Ipili, he says, are walking through the Sinai desert of tur-
bulent times, and need strong, responsible, “uncorrupted” local leader-
ship if they are to reach the Canaan of a post-mine future created by sus-
tainable development. His inability to find a Moses among landowners
results from the fact that Ipili believe the metaphor to be fundamentally
flawed—Ipili see their prehistoric existence as one of deprivation. As far
as they are concerned, they have already arrived in the land of milk and
honey.
After a discussion of Ipili culture and history it is easy to see why Ipili
might be unwilling to invest money in new businesses—they are in the
end times. Or are they? Like utopias of previous times, this new age of
mine-derived affluence still fails to live up to the Ipili hopes of unbridled
affluence. Their experience of the white world has been one of initial
excitement and growing disenchantment. And their frank assessment of
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the benefits and drawbacks of what they call “the white world” can tell
us about both Ipili culture and our own.
This sense of a disappointed utopia is particularly clear in Ipili relations
with white material culture. There is a keen sense among Ipili that the
physical objects that whites brought with them into the valley are trans-
formed but recognizable versions of their own. Novel but not essentially
new, white material culture is thus in some sense familiar to Ipili. Exciting,
new, and different, white objects are not shocking. Like the Hagen people
described by Strathern and by Merlan and Rumsey, Ipili people have a
keen sense of the way in which the white world is a lawa—replacement,
augmentation, transformation—of their own and thus simultaneously
both new and familiar (Merlan and Rumsey 1991; M Strathern 1988).
And when it comes to white material culture, white objects are seen as
“better” or “augmented” versions of well-known Ipili standbys by virtue
either of their infinite durability or endless replaceability.
The example of prepackaged food demonstrates one way in which Ipili
see white material culture as an augmentation of their own—white food
is easier to acquire and is disposable. As every US consumer knows, some
commodities are meant to be disposed and replaced by an infinite succes-
sion of exact duplicates, which are cheap and readily available. Here, the
work-wealth equation is short-circuited through replacement and conve-
nience—one’s desire for food can be fulfilled without any effort at all.
Take salt, for example. As in many other areas of the highlands, salt
was a valuable and scarce commodity in Enga (Wiessner and Tumu 1998).
Typically, wood soaked in salt springs was burned, and the resulting ash
salt was collected and traded over long distance. Much of Ipili involve-
ment in long-distance trading involved acting as middlemen in the salt
trade or traveling to salt springs owned by other groups with whom they
had ties in order to make their own salt. Today Ipili remain “salta-
holics”—every meal, be it rice or sweet potato, can and should be eaten
with salt, and preferably lots of it. Salt, like cooking oil and sweet potato,
is considered essential in any Ipili household. To be poor in Porgera is to
be without salt.
The contemporary white equivalent of salt (the lawa of salt) is, of
course, salt. The ubiquitous plastic bags of salt available in trade stores
today are seen by Ipili as essentially similar to the salt that they consumed
before contact, but “new and improved.” The salt that Ipili eat today is
different from what they had before. It is purer, cheaper, healthier, and
more readily available. The salt that Ipili eat today, then, is not merely
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analogous to the salt that they had before, it is identical but transformed
—the same but better. No more boring trading! Why waste hours soak-
ing wood at a salt pool? Just heat and serve! 
This tendency to see new food items as augmented, transformed ver-
sions of old standbys is even clearer in the case of cheese-flavored snack
food such as Cheese Twisties and Cheese Pops. Ipili refer to such items as
“white men’s frogs” (one monge) and they are eaten only by children.
Why? Ipili children traditionally spend a good deal of their time unsuper-
vised, running around the bush and hunting small animals such as frogs,
tadpoles, spiders, and other insects, which they then cook (or not) and
eat. Most Ipili—and especially Ipili boys—have engaged in this activity,
which is not surprising given the low level of protein in the typical Ipili
diet and the nutritional demands of growing children. As a result there is
an entire range of foods considered appropriate for children to eat, but not
adults. Cheese Twisties have come to be seen as analogs of these foods—
the lawa of tadpoles.
In sum, consumer goods—in this case premade food—offer the oppor-
tunity of satisfying one’s appetite without laboring to create food. They
can be purchased using mine-derived money for which one did not have
to labor. But Ipili also imagine white objects to be better than their own
because they are infinitely durable. 
So Ipili encounters with the white world have been with a segment of
it concerned with efficiency, durability, and precision itself. The presence
of mining culture in the Porgera valley has heightened the Ipili’s preexist-
ing concern with durability and given them a familiarity with the pro-
ductive, industrial technology of the West that many anthropologists
lack. Ipili have incorporated as “white” items that many anthropologists,
whose occupation puts them at a remove from primary industry, may not
be familiar with. Backhoes, loadmasters, autoclaves, primary crushers—
all of these are familiar to the Ipili. Thus while the Hawaiians described
by Sahlins may have sought “everything new and elegant” while spurn-
ing “coarse articles” (Sahlins 1990, 50), Ipili predilections for the perma-
nent coalesced happily with miners’ concerns for equipment and gear that
would survive heavy-duty wear and tear. 
This quality of durability is encapsulated by the term “permanent mate-
rial,” which has worked its way from English into Tok Pisin and Ipili.
White people’s goods are seen as the “permanent material” versions of
indigenous Ipili objects. The clearest example of improved durability
comes from the paradigmatic case of stone and steel tools. By 1999–2000,
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almost no one in the community where I did fieldwork had experienced
making or using a stone axe. Nonetheless, people universally remarked
on the difference in the effort it took to use stone versus steel when peo-
ple reflected on the changes from the past and the present. Steel axes had
become metonymic for the laborsaving properties of white material cul-
ture. Among the most present signs of the superiority of white technology
are the houses that the mine had built for the community in which I lived.
Physically constructed out of a timber frame with metal siding, houses
made out of these materials are known in Tok Pisin as coppa haus (made
of metal and timber), in contrast to bus haus (built of locally available
“bush” materials). In English, at least in Porgera, this distinction was
articulated as “permanent material house” and “bush house.” Permanent
material houses were understood to be just that—permanent.
As a result, Ipili expect white material culture to be not just durable, but
permanent. Axes stay sharp forever. Shoes—another keenly sought after
item—keep their tread and waterproofing even after extensive use on lime-
stone. “Permanent material” houses remain forever without maintenance.
Ipili think it is funny, but also absolutely accurate, to refer to a cigarette
lighter as “permanent material matches.” The idea of something being
permanent and unchanging, stable, and durable across time holds enor-
mous appeal for a people whose culture focuses on decay and regenera-
tion. Thus the idea of white objects being “permanent material” speaks
not only to dichotomies between the asocial bush and the cleared social
space of Ipili homesteads, it speaks of a way of short-circuiting the work-
wealth equation that is so central to the culture.
Thus we can see the rampant consumerism of Ipili society so stigma-
tized by outsiders—epitomized by the fabled cars that are abandoned by
their owners merely because a single tire has gone flat—is directly tied to
an Ipili understanding of white objects that has a deeply tragic side. For
in fact “permanent material objects” are not maintenance free, but in fact
maintenance intensive. Shoes require care—and preferably two pairs of
shoes should be worn on alternate days—if they are to last. Houses must
be maintained. Delicate clothes restrict what a wearer can do in them
without destroying them. It is one of the ironies of Ipili life that objects
meant to free one in fact ensnare one in a web of maintenance and work
much greater than that involving bush material objects, which are all, at
heart, disposable.
Like the prototypical US housewife in a kitchen full of “laborsaving
devices” that in fact demand more work from her, Ipili are often disap-
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pointed by their experience with white material culture. Houses with
burnt-out light bulbs, clogged gutters, and broken water pipes seem to
Ipili to have essentially missed the point and not to be permanent at all.
Cars that break down, shoes that wear out, axes that require sharpening,
electric stoves that require new heating coils, all seem to renege on the bet
that Ipili have made that their mountain will be replaced by “permanent
material objects.” The answer comes in the idea that Ipili were cheated by
the mine, and that the real houses, the high-quality houses, are somewhere
else—the most likely locations being in white countries and at other min-
ing developments where landowners have gotten “real” houses.
While textiles, metal, and Cheese Twisties are ubiquitous in Porgera
today, exposure to white forms of sociality is less common. Nonetheless,
there are enough white miners, businessmen, and researchers around that
all Porgerans have had at least a little contact, however fleeting, with
white people. In the case of the elite landowners who sit on boards of
directors and fly to Port Moresby and Australia for mine-related business,
experience with corporate culture and the Western legal system has been
more thoroughgoing. Throughout the entire spectrum of Ipili society, Ipili
ponder not only white material culture, but also white mores. Just as the
Ipili see the world of white material culture as an augmented version of
their own, so too do they understand the wider white world—paradig-
matically, Australia—as in some sense familiar. On the one hand, Ipili
conceive of white society as a utopic one in which strife and discord have
been vanquished. On the other hand, they imagine life in Australia as a
dystopia where everything they hold dear about kith and kin has been
replaced by a completely monetized system of relationships. 
Initial ideas about white people were, as we have seen, highly utopic.
In particular, the ability of colonial officers to end internecine feuds and
pacify the valley was seen as proof of the powerful ability of whites to live
in peace and harmony with one another. The introduction of Christianity
and the explicit articulation of Christian ethics by white missionaries pro-
vided an explanation for the origins of white interest in conflict avoid-
ance. In the mid-1960s and early 1970s, when Porgerans were first intro-
duced to the court system and fighting was suppressed in the valley, courts
were understood as something new, an innovation of the white men that
had no clear equivalent in Porgeran custom. Although analogies were
drawn between the way that both courts and homicide compensation
“ended fights,” the novelty of the legal institution was striking. The sup-
pression of violence by the government, the maintenance of social rela-
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tions via litigation rather than violence, and the Christian emphasis on
love and fellow feeling all came together to provide an alternative to the
Ipili way of life that seemed powerful and compelling to the people who
first experienced them.
Today, this sensibility has been dulled as Ipili have gained self-confi-
dence in their dealings with outsiders. Experience with court cases at the
national level, the work of hiring lawyers, making depositions, and so
forth has given a small but significant number of Ipili a chance to experi-
ence the operations of the legal system in a nonlocal setting. Among these
people and those close to them, the law is not seen as a way through which
white men pursue peace, but the arena in which they undertake conflict.
Litigation, in other words, is the lawa of tribal fighting, and courts, as one
man said to me, are “how white men fight.”
This came out especially in interviews I conducted with the senior men
who negotiated the Porgera compensation agreements with the govern-
ment in the late 1980s. These middlemen, the first Ipili to have gone to
college, saw analogies between preexisting aggressive cultural structures
and the Western legal system. One of the Ipili’s most experienced nego-
tiators, Jonathan Paraia, made this particularly clear to me when he dis-
cussed the formation of the Porgera Landowners Association in the mid
to late 1980s: 
They [less educated landowner leaders] didn’t know all this “companies” and
“associations” and all that, so I had to put it in a local context where they can
understand what it’s like, you know, how it operates. And they knew what
akali anda [the men’s house] was. The men’s house is where you sit down and
talk and plan and how to go and attack other people and how to go and take
things from other people. (laugh) How to negotiate. And they were already
used to that. And I was saying, you know, we’ve got to build our own akali
anda now, and some of you guys are going to be leaders like clan leaders and
subclan leaders, you’re going to be leaders like that. And that is where you are
going to deal with . . . national government, provincial government, and com-
pany on behalf of the landowners (Golub fieldnotes 1999).
In many ways Jonathan’s statement exemplifies Ipili predatory expansion.
First, through speaking with me, Jonathan was attempting to write into
the ethnographic record the fact that he founded the Porgera Landown-
ers Association—which is not in fact the case, his constant statements to
the contrary notwithstanding. Second, and even more remarkable, he was
drawing an analogy between a political pressure group and a traditional
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military institution. Jonathan’s gloss of “negotiate” as “go and attack
other people and how to go and take things from them” is revealing of the
way Jonathan and the Porgeran elite who interacted with the mine under-
stood negotiation with government and company representatives as the
lawa of Porgeran raiding parties.
On the one hand, contemporary Americans believe that systems of
redistributive justice such as the Western legal system enshrine standards
of impartiality, justice, and procedural fairness that could not be more at
odds with warfare in the central highlands of Papua New Guinea. On the
other hand, lawyers, judges, and other people actively involved in the legal
system might ruefully acknowledge that the Ipili are more right than some
would care to admit. Ipili see Western law as an augmented, transformed
version of their own methods of conflict, but however much we might
wish it, this identification might not be a misrecognition. In some ways
Porgerans’ long history of litigation has led them to some valuable insights
about Western culture that westerners might not like to hear.
But Ipili save their greatest shock and dismay for white familiar rela-
tions. It is here, more than anywhere else, that Ipili see white lives as the
dystopic negative of Ipili life.
The basic contrast here is between Papua New Guinea as a “free coun-
try” and Australia as a “money country.” Porgerans are proud of and
emphasize their autonomy. In Papua New Guinea, I was told repeatedly,
“you can run free, eat free, sleep free.” Those without formal employment
could rely on “wantoks” (friends and relatives) for food. In contrast, Aus-
tralia (like Port Moresby) is a place where those without money are desti-
tute and homeless. In Australia, you must purchase food, rent a house, and
pay taxes. This attitude seems to be at least forty years old, for in 1964 one
patrol officer noted, “concerning the ethos of the Paiela people I gradually
came to the conclusion that he regards himself as a superior being to the
European, in fact as being superior to any other race of people. The supe-
rior material possessions and powers of the European are nonchalantly
passed away as being essential to the white man for him to survive,
whereas he, the Paiela, needs only a garden of sweet potato, his axe and
bow to exist” (Porgera, folder 1, 64/65).
Classically, sociology distinguishes between societies with ascriptive sta-
tus versus those with achieved status, and the creation of a formally free,
monetized economy is understood to result in more freedom and auton-
omy rather than less. But Porgerans, like Marxists, are keenly aware of
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just how far one can fall in a world where one cannot exit the market and
return to a subsistence lifestyle. Thus Ipili understandings of whites artic-
ulate with a certain leftist suspicion of merely formal freedom.
But this is not all. Ipili are not just afraid of a monetized economy, they
believe all of white life to be completely and totally commodified—as if all
interactions are mediated by cash payments. It is this aspect of white life
that Ipili find appalling. One of the most common questions I was asked
in Porgera—indeed, often the first question I was asked—was whether it
was true that white parents charged their children money for food and
rent. The idea, I gathered, was that mealtime in white households was
more or less analogous to ordering in a restaurant.
Whereas anthropologists often describe the virtues of others as part of
a critique of their own vices, Ipili imagine the pathologies of whites in
order to make their own strengths more clear. But could the exacting,
extractive white parent imagined by the Ipili be such a powerful image
because of its similarity to their own weaknesses? In a valley where found-
ing myths feature parents attempting to take the lives of their children, it
could be that the dreams that the Ipili have of us are in fact nightmares
about what they could easily become.
Conclusion
As stereotypes of the “ecologically noble savage” begin to show signs of
aging, anthropologists and the general public have attempted to generate
more satisfying accounts of indigenous people’s complex desires for devel-
opment, political autonomy, and cultural independence. In the case of
Papua New Guinea, anthropologists often live with communities encoun-
tering nearly stereotypic David-and-Goliath struggles with resource devel-
opers. However, when examined close up the David that anthropologists
encounter often fails to live up to expectations. In this paper I have
attempted to provide an account of the cultural underpinnings and histor-
ical circumstance that might help render Ipili behavior and attitudes intel-
ligible to a wider audience.
The title of the paper is intended to capture what I understand to be
the overall approach the Ipili have to encountering outsiders. Ipili retain
a certain sort of predatory expansion when it comes to new things, a self-
confidence that has rendered the Ipili very successful in dealing with
whites even as it has caused elites in Port Moresby to revile them. To the
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Ipili, whites have become reflectors of their own identity—desirable and
yet despicable, worthy of emulation in some ways and yet tragically
flawed in others. And vice versa.
To an audience familiar with stereotypes of noble savages, the reaction
of the Ipili to the mine can be startling. Elites in Port Moresby who
romanticize a traditional “Melanesian Way” feel betrayed by landowners
who fail to conform to their expectations. At the same time, first-world
activists interested in finding “guardians of the forest” in Porgera will be
disappointed indeed at the alacrity with which the Ipili, as they say,
“traded their mountain for development.”
But it may be that the unease the Ipili instill in others is due to the fact
that they are driven by concerns remarkably like “our own.” Their desire
for new commodities, time-saving devices, and prepared food is in many
ways not so different from what one would find in any major city in the
United States. Thus it could be said that “they” are not as bad as “we”
are, or, to put it another way, that “we” are as good as “they.”
So which is the original affluent society? Just as we see our own weak
points in Ipili prodigality, so do Ipili imagine whites, as a version of their
present or possible selves. This examination of Ipili culture reveals them
to be a bit more like ourselves than we have been led to believe. Sahlins
looked to hunters and gatherers to explode the Western, Hobbesian con-
ception of infinite need. Studying the Ipili suggests that the West is not the
only place plagued by need and want. Ipili do not denounce consumer
society in the name of a pristine, authentic primitivism. They denounce it
for failing to make good on its promises. The problem, as they see it, is
not enough affluence.
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Abstract
The idea of the “ecologically noble savage” once linked environmental activists
and indigenous people. Today the concept is increasingly seen as problematic. In
the Porgera district of Enga Province, Papua New Guinea, Ipili people confront
massive social change brought about by the presence of a large gold mine. This
paper explores how Ipili people find some aspects of global consumer culture to
offer utopian possibilities for change, while others present dystopic inversions of
their own culture. In doing so, it compares Western attempts to understand Ipili
as noble or ignoble savages with Ipili attempts to make sense of the material cul-
ture and mores of outsiders. It concludes that both Ipili and westerners have
unsettling insights into each other’s culture.
keywords: Porgera, Enga, Papua New Guinea, mining, affluent society, con-
sumerism, utopia 
